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Recent Cases
CORPORATIONS-STOcE T sFER BESTRITONs-DEvOLuTION AT DEATH
-The bylaws of Taylor Trunk Company, a family corporation, pro-
vided: "That no transfer or sale of the stock of the company can be
made without first offering said stock for sale to the remaining stock-
holders at a price of 5% less than the book value of said stock for a
period of 60 days upon a pro rata basis of their holdings at the time
said offer is made." The entire stock of the company was owned by
Guthrie Taylor, Leonard Taylor and Robert Taylor, brothers; the first
two held 124 shares each, and Robert Taylor owned 2 shares. Robert
Taylor died in 1938, leaving his entire estate to his wife. As the two
shares of stock were then pledged to secure a loan, their existence
was not discovered until 1953. Guthrie Taylor, as president of the
company, declined to transfer the stock registrations to the wife.
Leonard Taylor, who had qualified as administrator, and the wife
sued to require the corporation to make the transfer. The trial court
ruled that under the bylaw provision set out above, the corporation
need not transfer the registration until the administrator should have
first offered it for sale, one share each to Leonard Taylor and Guthrie
Taylor. On appeal, reversed: The words "transfer or sale" here apply
only to voluntary sales and not to devolution of title by operation of
law upon the death of the shareholder. Furthermore, Kentucky Re-
vised Statutes, sec. 395.280 requires that title to a deceased share-
holder's stock be transferred to the legatee under a will. Taylor's Adm'r
v. Taylor, 301 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1957).
The instant case deserves special notice for several reasons. The
Court dealt with several subsidiary legal points relating to the validity
of stock transfer restrictions in Kentucky. In addition, the Court com-
mented upon the effect to be given Section 15 of the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act, adopted in Kentucky in 1944,' although that provision
was held inapplicable to the present case. Inasmuch as this is the
first Kentucky case in which the validity of stock transfer restrictions
has been expressly delimited, this comment will deal briefly with
that general subject before exploring the specific holding.
General Validity of Restrictions on Transfer
Since the transactions in this case arose in 1938, prior to the adop-
tion of Section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the validity of
IKy. Rev. Stat. sec. 274.150 (1956).
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stock transfer restrictions had to be determined by reference to the
common law.
Transferability of shares is a fundamental characteristic of corpora-
tions, and may be regarded as one point of differentiation between
corporations and common-law partnerships.2 During the early de-
velopment of corporation law, restrictions upon stock transfers were
often held invalid as illegal restraints upon alienation of property,3 or
as impairing the remedies of shareholders' creditors.4 However, the
general proposition that reasonable restrictions on transfer are valid
is now so well accepted as to be hornbook law,5 and the Kentucky
Court expressly accepted the general rule in the present case.0
There remains a conflict as to the methods which may be used to
effect reasonable restrictions. Restrictions authorized by statute,7 con-
tained in the charter or articles of incorporation, 8 or agreed to by the
stockholders are generally upheld. There is more diversity of opinion
concerning reasonable restrictions contained in bylaws, but the ma-
jority also holds such restrictions valid.10 The court, in the present
case, approved the majority rule but found that the stockholders had,
in fact, actually adopted the by-law restriction in question so that it
was undoubtedly valid from the standpoint of proper authorization.
In its discussion of Kentucky Revised Statutes, see. 274.150 (Section
15, Uniform Stock Transfer Act), the court indicated that this pro-
vision would, in the future, give validity to any reasonable restriction
so long as the restrictive terms appear upon the stock certificate. Sec-
tion 15 has been adopted in forty-six states, and this interpretation
has been given it in all but one of the states which have adopted and
interpreted it." One court has said that Section 15 merely adds to the
pre-existing law of an adopting state12 the requirement that the re-
striction appear upon the certificate, and the wording of the statute
2 Stevens, Corporations 598 (2d ed. 1949).
3Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129, 34 AUt. 1127 (1896).41n re Klaus, 67 Wis. 401, 29 N.W. 582 (1886); Bryon v. Carter, 22 La.
Ann. 98 (1870).
5 Stevens, Corporations 599 (2d ed. 1949); Ballentine, Corporations 775-76(Rev. ed. 1946).6 Taylor's Adm'r v. Taylor, 301 S.W. 2d 579, 582 (Ky. 1957).
7 For example, Section 15, Uniform Stock Transfer Act.8 12 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations sec. 5453 (Perm. ed. 1957 rev. vol.);
Stevens, Corporations 600-01 (2d ed. 1949); 13 Am. Jur., Corporations see. 334,
p. 411 (1938).
0 12 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations sec. 5455 (Perm. ed. 1957 rev. vol.);
Stevens, Corporations 601 (2d ed. 1949); 13 Am. Jur., Corporations sec. 336
(1938).
10 12 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations sec. 5455 (Perm. ed. 1957 rev. vol.).
11 Annot., 29 A.L.R. 2d 901 (1953).12 First National Bank of Canton v. Shanks, 34 Ohio Op. 359, 73 N.E. 2d 93(C.P. 1945).
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seems to lend itself to such an interpretation. 13 However, the point
seems academic since the Kentucky Court interprets the common law
as holding reasonable by-law restrictions valid, at least where the
stock is accepted with notice of such restrictions.
The views of the court, as discussed above, appear to be generally
in consonance with those of the majority of courts and are mentioned
here to draw attention to the case as one of first impression.
The Specific Holding
The court advanced two grounds for its holding. First, the words
"transfer or sale" in the bylaw were construed as applying only to
voluntary sales and not to devolution of title by operation of law.
Second, Kentucky Revised Statutes, sec. 895.230 was construed as
overriding the restriction in any application to transfer by death.
In relation to the first point, the court said, "The terms of the by-
law . . . seem to be limited to a voluntary sale, although 'transfer'
and 'sale' are stated as alternatives. The use of the word 'transfer'
looks to a sale and has no natural application to any other disposi-
tion."14
It is difficult to understand why the word "transfer," stated alterna-
tively, means no more than "sale," especially when used ahead of the
alternate rather than following it in possible amplification. If either
word should receive primary emphasis, it should be the one placed
first in order. As to the ordinary legal meaning of "transfer," Webster's
defines it as "the conveyance of right, title, or property, either real or
personal, from one person to another, whether by sale, by gift, or
otherwise; any act by which the property of one person is vested in
another."15 (italics added) The definition given by the Restatement of
Property is, "The extinguishment of interests existing in one person
and the creation of such interests in another person."0
If any plain meaning is implicit in the bylaw itself, it would seem
to be that "transfer" means more than "sale". To say that the word
"looks to a sale" is merely to state a conclusion. The words "no transfer
or sale . . . can be made" (emphasis added) do not connote only
voluntary, affirmative action, but are conscientiously framed in a pas-
sive sense to avoid mentioning action by any particular party. Had the
draftsmen intended to prohibit only voluntary sales by shareholders,
13Note that Section 15 is negatively framed, saying ". . . there shall be no
restriction upon the transfer of shares . . . unless . . . stated upon the certificate."
1 Taylors Adm'r v. Taylor, 801 S.W. 2d 579, 583 (Ky. 1957).
15 Webster's New International Dictionary 2689 (2d ed. 1944).
16 Restatement, Property sec. 13 ( 1) (1936).
[ ol. 4 ,
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they could have easily stated that no shareholder might sell his stock,
briefly and straightforwardly.
A consideration of the purpose to be accomplished by restrictions
of this kind leads to the conclusion that the framers must have intended
this restriction to have a wider application than that given it by the
court. The purpose behind stock transfer restrictions is usually to
enable the stockholders to exclude persons undesirable to them from
ownership and control of the corporation. 17 This is widely recognized
as a legitimate motive, especially in the case of closely held family
corporations.'8 Unless this purpose is completely ignored, it seems
impossible to logically exclude transfers by descent from the intended
operation of the present restriction. The stockholders are giving them-
selves insufficient protection from intruders if they may not exercise
the buying option ahead of legatees, distributees, and creditors. Who
knows who these people may turn out to be? Surely it is illogical to
ascribe to the corporation an intent to make such a paradoxical and
useless distinction. The court, in its interpretation, is in effect saying
that the corporation knowingly defeated its own purpose.
It is the opinion of the writer that the court has gone to unusual
lengths to put a strained, unnatural construction upon ordinary words,
and in so doing has needlessly thwarted the purpose ordinarily im-
plicit in stock transfer restrictions.
The court did not, however, rest its opinion solely upon this point
of interpretation. The second foundation, apparently given even
greater weight, involved the application of Kentucky Revised Statutes,
see. 395.230 to stock transfer restrictions. The pertinent parts of this
statute are as follows:
In order to effect the distribution of a deceased person's estate ...
the county court may ... [after provisions for taxes] ... au-
thorize the personal representative to transfer shares of corporate
stock which the decedent owned at his death .... Such transfers
shall be made to the persons entitled under the will or as distributees
in case of intestacy. (emphasis added)
This statute was construed as 'law which gives the shareholder
the right to bequeath it [the stock] and his personal representative
authority to receive and hold the stock and distribute it to 'the persons
entitled under the will.'"19 The court said that this statute provides
by necessary implication that the corporation must transfer the stock.
17 Stevens, Corporations 599 (2d ed. 1949).
18 Succinctly stated endorsements may be found in Barrett v. King; 181 Mass.
476, 63 N.E. 934 (1902), by Holmes, J.; Bloomingdale v. Bloomingdale, 107 Misc.
646, 177 N.Y.S. 873 (1919); and Casper v. Kalt-Zimmer Mfg. Co., 159 Wis. 517,
149 N.W. 754 (1914).
19 Taylor's Admr v. Taylor, 301 S.W. 2d 579, 583 (Ky. 1957).
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Again, after the court had distinguished a number of cases from
other jurisdictions holding that devolution by death did come within
stock transfer restrictions, it pointed to the statute as a law not in-
volved in the foreign cases and making "the greater difference."20
The court construed the above statute as requiring a transfer of
the stock to the legatee, regardless of what might have been the in-
tended effect of the restriction. If this is the case, then it is impossible,
in Kentucky, for a corporation to prevent its stock from coming into
the hands of persons adverse to the interests of the corporation where
the transfer is effected by will or intestate succession.
The basis upon which the court enunciated this rule is a statute
which, by its terms, appears to warrant no such interpretation. The
words of the statute are plainly permissive. While the statute says
that the county court may order distribution, the court has said that
such an order must be issued. Further, the statute says that under
such an order "transfers shall be made to the persons entitled . . "
(italics added). Even if the issuance of the distribution order were
mandatory, it would seem that the question of entitlement would
have to be determined before any person could require a transfer.
If the restriction were intended to give the remaining stockholders
an option to buy, and if, the statute aside, the restriction were valid,
the persons entitled could not be determined before exercise or waiver
of the option. In this sense, it appears that the statute is brought into
play too quickly, and the court begs the question when it assumes
that the named legatee is entitled to the stock.
Although no records of legislative debate on this statute have been
found, its introductory words, "In order to effect the distribution of a
deceased person's estate," suggest to the writer that the legislature
thought of the statute as no more than a procedural measure designed
to facilitate the settling of estates involving corporate stock.
If the court actually means to say that a stock transfer restriction
may never give the corporation a right to purchase its stock ahead of
a legatee or distributee, regardless of the language of the restriction
and the purpose it intended to accomplish, then this case appears to
be the only one of its kind.21 The great weight of authority maintains
20Id., at 584 (Ky. 1957).2
1Although restrictions have sometimes been construed as not intended to
apply to transfer by death, the writer has found no case holding that a restriction
intended to so apply would be invalid. The closest case is perhaps Stem v. Stem,
79 U.S. App. D.C. 340, 146 F. 2d 870 (1945). Many cases hold that restrictions
may bind a decedent's personal representative: Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp.,
2 N.Y. 2d 534, 161 N.Y.S. 2d 418, 141 N.E. 2d 812 (1957); Ky. Package Store,
Inc. v. Checani, 331 Mass. 125, 117 N.E. 2d 139 (1954); Boston Safe D. & T. Co.
v. North Attleborough Chapter, 330 Mass. 114, 111 N.E. 2d 447 (1953); Palmer
[Vol. 46,
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that a corporation is justified, in the interests of its stockholders, in
seeking to control stock ownership through the option to buy,22 and
that restrictions may operate effectively upon transfers by death.23 In
the case of small, closely-held corporations, such restrictions serve a
widely approved and sometimes urgent purpose.
If the policy favoring reasonable restrictions may be accepted as
valid, the present decision should be closely evaluated and perhaps
regarded as distinguishable on future occasions. If the restriction
policy is approved, only to have its application defeated whenever an
individual shareholder dies, then the interests of corporate ownership
groups are needlessly impaired.
Jesse S. Hogg
CnamTAL PNocErE-N~mowNG rm DocrimE OF T=E TRtsPAssiNG
OFFcER-State Police officers, dressed in street clothes and driving an
unmarked car, drove off a public highway onto the private property
of the defendant. Acting on information of bootlegging and on per-
sonal observation of an unusual flow of traffic to and from an aban-
doned service station on the defendant's property, the officers turned
into the encircling drive, approached the back door and ordered beer.
When the defendant returned from the building with the order, the
officers placed him under arrest, seized the beer and proceeded to
search the nearby building. The defendant was convicted of the
illegal sale of intoxicating liquors, fined and imprisoned.1 He appealed
unsuccessfully to the Rowan Circuit Court, and then to the Court of
Appeals, assigning as error the admission into evidence of the beer
taken form his person. Held: affirmed. 'The officers were not tres-
passers but were business invitees. They could properly arrest for a
misdemeanor committed in their presence and make an incidental
search of the defendant's body and seize the beer found thereon.
Staton v. Commonwealth, 307 S.W. 2d 570 (Ky. 1957).
The court reasoned that the officers making the arrest were cus-
tomers, not trespassers, regardless of their intent. The court cited no
authority, but distinguished Alfred v. Commonwealth,2 the principal
case relied on by the defendant. In that case the court held that when
v. Chamberlain, 191 F. 2d 532 (1951), Misc. 68 N.Y.S. 2d 335 (1946); Searles v.
Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 128 Me. 34, 145 AUt. 391 (1929).
22 12 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations see. 5454, at 306 (Perm ed. 1957 rev.
vol.).
Vo.3 Ibid.
1 See Ky. Rev. Stat. see. 242.230(1) (1956).
2 272 S.W. 2d 44 (Ky. 1954).
